












In the not so distant past, law students often opened their 
Contracts casebooks to find a quotation from Sir Henry Maine, 
“The movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a 
movement from Status to Contract.”1  The placement of this 
quotation at the beginning of a Contracts book sets the tone for the 
semester or the year, providing a theme that the law professor either 
embraced or critiqued:  the idea that contract is liberatory.2  This 
Essay, part of a collection of essays on the same theme, argues that 
contract law has become an instrument of oppression and 
dispossession rather than liberation.  Having offered a critique, the 
challenge then is to consider whether it is possible to restore the 
liberatory potential of contract.  The symposium, Post-Marxism, Post-
Racialism & Other Fables of the Dispossession, was an invitation to 
consider the contemporary relevance of Marxist theory.  The aspect 
of Marxist theory referenced in this particular essay is cultural and 
ethnographic, a methodology suggested by Robert Sullivan’s 
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1  SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 5 (1864).  See e.g., JOHN 
EDWARD MURRAY, CONTRACTS: CASE AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2001).  A 
more expansive selection from Ancient Law  can be found in a contracts 
casebook that is now out of print, FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET. AL, CONTRACTS:  
CASES AND MATERIALS (1986). 
2  The authors of Kessler’s casebook made the assumptions about the 
connection between contract and liberty explicit: “As a matter of historical 
fact, the rise of free and informal contract within western civilization reflected 
the erosion of a status organized society; contract became, at an ever 
increasing rate, a tool of change and growing self-determination and self-
assertion.”  KESSLER, supra note 1, at 5. 
  




argument that Marx was anthropological in his epistemology and in 
his form of argument.3  Sullivan also argues that the theoretical 
approach advocated by some anthropologists, a “cultural critique of 
ourselves,”4 is Marxist because it is the “modern analogue to Marx’s 
earlier use of primitive society as both a critique of nineteenth 
century capitalist economy and as an alternative way of ‘seeing’ 
reality.”5  Modern Ethnography, he concludes, “produces its critique 
. . . by demystifying and denaturalizing cultural texts and ‘reading’ 
their social meaning.”6 
There are two reference points in this cultural critique.  One 
is the importance of social position in a jurisprudence that embraces 
objectivity; the uncritical and unreflective reliance on hegemonic 
social practices, codes and conventions in determining whether the 
parties to an agreement meant or intended it to be legally 
enforceable. Contract law recognizes and regulates status 
relationships.  The resort by judges to hegemonic conceptions of 
status results in dispossession when a contract which is exploitive is 
enforced against the less powerful party or when courts refuse to 
enforce contracts that have liberatory potential.  The other aspect of 
a cultural critique is a focus on the discursive practices used by 
judges in contract cases.  For example, these rhetorical devices may 
invoke ideals of freedom, autonomy and voluntariness to explain or 
justify the enforcement of contract terms that disadvantage or defeat 
the expectations of workers.  In other cases, freedom and autonomy 
are jettisoned in favor of a rhetoric of scarcity, efficiency or market 
imperatives in order to defeat the contract claims of employees, 
particularly when the bargaining power of the workers has been 
enhanced by collective bargaining. 
 
I. CONTRACT AS DISPOSSESSION:  STATUS AND INTENT AS 
“SOCIALLY LEGITIMATE” EXPECTATIONS 
 
Students of business organizations are drawn to partnership 
law because of the intimacy of the relationship and the drama 
                                                                                                       
3  Robert Sullivan, Marxism and the “Subject” of Anthropology in 
MODERNIST ANTHROPOLOGY FROM FIELDWORK TO TEXT 243 (Marc 
Manganaro ed., 1990). 
4  See, e.g., GEORGE MARCUS & MICHAEL M. J. FISCHER, 
ANTHROPOLOGY AS CULTURAL CRITIQUE:  AN EXPERIMENTAL MOMENT IN 
THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1986). 
5  See Robert Sullivan, supra note 3, at 260.   
6  Id.  
 




inherent in struggles between and among partners.7  There is no 
other area of law better suited to illustrate the importance of status, 
which is, for purposes of this analysis, the position each of us 
occupies in the hierarchical social order that exists in the United 
States.  Once a matter of common law, partnership is now governed 
by the Uniform Partnership Act.  Status is explicit in the definition 
of partnership as “an association of two or more persons for the 
purpose of carrying on as co-owners of a business for profit,” in the 
laundry list of relationships which are not partnership.8  The courts 
in the Nineteenth and early-Twentieth century adopted and 
abandoned various tests for partnership, but the test which currently 
has pride of place, an inquiry into the intent of the parties, is 
consistent with the characterization of partnership as a contract and  
the statutory definition of the relationship as “co-ownership.”  The 
status, “owner,” is a socially constructed identity.  The indices of 
ownership are risk, the potential for profit or loss, and control, but 
courts are uncritical in their examination of the various ways in 
which either or both can be shared, unreflective about their a priori 
assumptions and the meaning assigned to the words and behavior of 
the parties.  Judicial analysis of intent does not take place in a 
vacuum.  Part of that analysis, often implicit rather than explicit, is 
the judges’ understanding of when it is socially and culturally 
possible or plausible for the parties to consider themselves co-
owners.  
Partnership can be the most egalitarian of business 
relationships.  The default terms in partnership law give partners 
equal rights to control the business and equal shares of the profits.  
Labor has value in attaining the status of co-owner in a partnership.9  
One early common law test for partnership explicitly acknowledged 
that partnerships could be formed between or among parties who 
contributed property, money, or labor.10  No legal scholar has 
quantified the number of times courts have concluded that someone 
who contributed labor to an enterprise was a partner.  A review of 
                                                                                                       
7  See Deborah W. Post, Continuity and Change:  Partnership Formation 
Under the Common Law, 40 VILL. L. REV. 987 (1986). 
8  Uniform Partnership Act of 1914, §§ 6, 7 (2007).  
9  Even though labor was considered sufficient to claim a partnership 
interest in the Nineteenth century, labor was not monetized for purposes of 
recording an initial capital contribution in the business.  It was only after that 
labor was expended and profits earned that the person who put in ideas or 
expertise or management skills would see his interest recorded as capital.  If 
the business lost money, he would lose the value of his labor and “equality” 
meant that he would have to share in the capital losses. 
10  Post, supra note 7, at 1033 n.122. 
  




the cases does, however, show that status is implicated:  prior or 
existing relationships matter in determining whose labor will be 
sufficient to support a claim of co-ownership—family members, 
former employees, women, or persons of color.  
In the older cases, the social order is explicit.  Behavior and 
words were interpreted in light of cultural expectations.  The 
relationship between wives and husbands may have been negotiated 
in their everyday lives, but that did not mean the law acknowledged 
or enforced those agreements.  In Watson v. Hamilton,11 a 1912 
Alabama case, the autonomy and the expectations of a wife who had 
negotiated with her husband for an ownership interest in what she 
supposed was a family business were defeated by a court that 
refused to give effect to that agreement.12  Mr. Hamilton might have 
added his wife’s name to the name of the business and acquiesced 
(or at least he did not contradict her) when, as she worked with him, 
he heard her tell his customers that she was an owner of the 
business.  The court rejected this evidence of his intention to share 
the business with her because it knew that he meant only to appease 
her.13  He did not intend to make her a co-owner because that 
would have exposed her to the risk of loss, something no husband 
would do.14  As far as the court was concerned, the wife had no 
interest in the business and her niece, the heir to whom she left her 
property and the plaintiff in this case, had no claim against the 
partnership for the value of her aunt’s interest.  
Despite a shared assumption in contract theory that context 
matters and in anthropology that cultural assumptions vary over 
time and regionally in the United States, seventy years later, a federal 
judge in New York explained his decision in Sherrier v. Richards15 in a 
way that suggests there is some consistency in the meaning assigned 
to a species of verbal exchange between men and women in intimate 
relations.  In 1983, Judge Robert W. Sweet described the verbal 
exchange between a man and woman, a wealthy widow who 
financed art acquisitions and her married actor/art dealer lover, as 
an “anything you say, dear” moment.16  The reasonableness of this 
interpretation was corroborated, as far as the judge was concerned, 
by testimony of the woman that in another context, the same or 
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15  Sherrier v. Richard, 564 F. Supp 448, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
16  Id. 
 




similar language was “a conversational device to diffuse an 
argument.”17  The apparent assent of Mr. Sherrier to a proposal that 
would have transformed a loan from Ms. Richards into equity in a 
business was dismissed as inconsequential, and therefore insufficient 
to establish the intent to form a partnership.  And, of course, 
without intent there can be no contract for partnership.  
Whether the parties are married or simply lovers, the 
coexistence of economic and emotional ties alters the way courts 
understand even the most straightforward expressions of contractual 
intent.  In both Watson and Sherrier, the courts constructed a 
presumptive negative intent with respect to a claim of partnership 
from cultural norms that originate in the status of the parties as 
intimates.   
If contract were liberatory, courts would have to 
acknowledge that private ordering may be subversive of the existing 
social order; contract law would be a means of dismantling 
structures of subordination.  Contract law is theorized as a system of 
private ordering, but judges are not particularly receptive to private 
arrangements that are subversive.  A courtroom is not the place 
where cultural or social transgressions are routinely validated, even 
when the law as expressed seems sufficiently malleable and capable 
of accommodating the behavior of outliers on the cultural 
landscape.  The predictable response in contract disputes that have 
transformative potential is to bring them into alignment with 
hegemonic assumptions about social status.18   
A post-reconstruction era partnership case out of Texas is 
instructive on the relationship between cultural expectations, social 
norms, and contract.  The political and socioeconomic reality in the 
South included a system of laws and social conventions that 
expressed and enforced a racial caste system.  Yet transgressive 
social relationships formed during the era of Jim Crow, including 
                                                                                                       
17  Id. 
18  For an opposing standpoint, see Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches 
to Contract Law, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 829 (1983).  In this article, Professor 
Feinman suggests that a plant closing case out of the Sixth Circuit—Local 
1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corporation, 492 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. 
Ohio 1980) and Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corporation, 
631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980)—“reveal[s] a striking if not fully developed 
awareness of contract law’s potential as a revolutionary vehicle.”  Id. at 858.  
  




relationships that involved political or economic cooperation or 
exchange, were not unknown.19   
There is a story told in Texas—either fact or fable—about a 
black man who cornered the market on potatoes.  If he wanted to 
exploit the monopoly he had on the existing supply of potatoes in a 
way that maximized his profits, he needed to market these potatoes 
to whites as well as blacks.  He was cognizant of the fact that his 
business acuity might not be well received in the white community.  
His ability to extract higher prices was certainly constrained by Jim 
Crow.  So this black man struck a deal with a white man who owned 
a dry goods establishment.  He agreed to share the profits from his 
sales if the white man would provide him with “cover.”  The black 
man painted his wagons the same color as the wagons that delivered 
for the dry goods store and embellished them with the name of that 
business.  He then drove all over Houston delivering potatoes to 
white families willing to pay the market price for potatoes. 
The verisimilitude of this story, the possibility that such an 
agreement could have existed, is supported by case law.  Gene Butler 
v. State20 features a black man in Austin, Texas, who, in 1908, 
apparently was given responsibility for developing business hauling 
gravel and dirt.  The question of partnership was raised as a defense 
in an appeal after Butler was accused and convicted of embezzling 
money from a white man named Dillingham.21  If Butler and 
Dillingham were partners—if Dillingham put his wagons and horses 
into a business to which Butler contributed his labor and perhaps 
any good will associated with his reputation as a driver—there 
would not have been a crime.  As a co-owner of the business, Butler 
could not be guilty of embezzlement. 
In earlier cases, precedent cited by defense counsel and the 
presiding judge in his dissent, white men who had arrangements like 
that of Butler and Dillingham were partners.22  The behavior of the 
                                                                                                       
19  One example might be the alliance of whites and blacks in the 
Alabama Sharecroppers Union, which is described in an oral history of Nate 
Shaw.  NATE SHAW & THEODORE ROSENGARTEN, ALL GOD’S DANGERS:  
THE LIFE OF NATE SHAW (1974). 
20  111 S.W. 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908). 
21  Id. 
22  Race is not explicitly mentioned in those cases and because it 
would be unusual for a black man to sue a white man on a claim of 
partnership, a social reality acknowledged in Butler, the reasonable inference is 
that the parties were both white in those cases.  See Manuel v. State, 71 S.W. 
973 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903) (money advanced for purchase of saloon); Ray v. 
State, 86 S.W. 761, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 1905) (alleged embezzlement by one 
 




parties was all that mattered in determining partnership.  In Butler v. 
State, however, the majority justified its decision by citing the 
testimony of the two parties as to their intent.23  The court admitted 
that its decision did not comport with prior precedent, but 
concluded: 
The testimony of appellant was to the effect that he did not 
regard the arrangement between himself and Dillingham as 
a partnership.  Dillingham also testified to the same effect.  
Under this testimony and in the light of the charge of the 
court, we think that appellant is absolutely without any 
ground or cause of complaint.24 
The defense attorney must have been aware that his reliance 
on precedent and principle would require the court to validate a 
relationship that was taboo.  In that sense, at least, the analogy he 
drew between Butler and an earlier defendant in a civil suit and the 
defendants in earlier criminal cases was inapposite.25  The 
application of existing precedent would have exonerated Mr. Butler, 
which the majority opinion in the case conceded.  An “objective” 
test, one that looked at the meaning that the parties could 
reasonably assign to their behavior; the intent that their acts 
expressed, should have produced a different result.   
Unlike the earlier cases, the court and the parties to this 
dispute were constrained by racial ideology and social practices, 
which made any expression of equality between these two parties 
impossible.  The defense attorney’s brief, from which the dissenting 
judge quoted extensively, is a case study of the way subjectivity is 
                                                                                                       
who put in “skill and ability to judge cattle”); McCrary v. State, 103 S.W. 924 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1907) (alleged embezzlement of proceeds from sale of 
organ); Kelly Island & Lime Transp. v. Masterson, 93 S.W. 427 (Tex. 1906) 
(defendant was partners with company building roads in Beaumont because he 
put in money and they put in labor). 
23  According to Dillingham, “ ‘the defendant, Gean Butler, that negro 
boy there, was hauling gravel and dirt with a team of mine in said county . . . 
The arrangement between Butler and myself with reference to this hauling was 
this:  I agreed to furnish the team, wagon and harness, feed the team, keep the 
mules shod, feed defendant and give him a place to sleep, and he was to take 
the team and do such hauling as he could get, and we were to divide the 
money made by him in hauling, half and half.”  This arrangement was one the 
defense argued constituted a partnership.  The court notes that Dillingham 
“further testified he had no intention of creating a partnership between himself 








constructed.  In this brief, which refers to the defendant as an 
“ignorant negro,” the interplay of external and internal “forces” is 
apparent:  the representations and symbols that are extant in any 
community and individual consciousness and agency, are on 
display.26  As the dissent acknowledged, neither the black man nor 
the white man in Butler would have contemplated or admitted in 
court or in public that they were partners.27 
The past is always instructive in understanding the present.  
Status defined by nationality or class has played an important role in 
the way contract law treats the working class.  The contracts 
casebook I wrote with Nancy Ota and Amy Kastely begins with the 
nineteenth century contract labor case in Hawaii, H.J. Coolidge v. 
Pua’aiki and Kea.28   A while ago, I was trying to convince a colleague 
to adopt the casebook for his class.  “You can’t really expect me to 
use a book that begins with a contract labor case?” he asked with 
some incredulity.  I suppose he thought his objections to a contract 
labor case were self-evident.  For my part, I was sure he did not see 
the irony of such an assertion at a moment when United States v. 
Sabhnanis29 was being tried in the federal court across the street.  The 
Sabhnanis starved, beat, and tortured their domestic help, in 
violation of the Anti-Peonage statute, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
the Trafficking Victims and Violence Prevention Act.    
One could argue that the law no longer legitimizes the 
peonage of people of color.  To the contrary, as the Sabhnanis case 
shows, the law punishes such behavior.  This answer, however, is 
reassuring but self-deluding.  Businesses are built upon the 
immigration policies of the United States, which facilitate the 
recruitment of some foreign workers and guarantee cheap labor by 
excluding others.  Global Horizons Manpower Inc., for instance, is a 
“labor recruiting firm” charged with trafficking four hundred Thai 
                                                                                                       
26  Id. 
27  According to the defense attorney, Butler testified on cross-
examination that “he guessed” he was not a partner of Dillingham’s and “he 
guessed” the money he received from Dillingham was wages.  Id.  As for 
Dillingham, the defense attorney argued that it would not have occurred to 
him that “his contract with the negro constituted them partners.  Dillingham 
would doubtless have scorned such a relationship.”  Id.  The lawyer concluded, 
and the dissenting judge agreed that the testimony of these two witnesses was 
“of little, if any, value” in deciding the partnership question.  Id. 
28  3 Haw. 810 (1877). 
29  599 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 




farm workers forced to work on farms in Hawaii.30  H.J. Coolidge,31 
decided in 1877, involved a statutory scheme that made it possible 
for large sugar plantations to find the labor they needed–both 
indigenous Hawai’ians and workers recruited in China, Japan, and 
eventually in Portugal, the Philipines and Korea.  The legal context 
of the Global Horizons Management case is the ability of the labor 
contractors to obtain or procure H-2A visas for the workers who 
are transported to the United States.32 
 
II. DISCURSIVE PRACTICES AND DISPOSSESSION:  THE 
RHETORIC OF AUSTERITY OR SCARCITY  
 
H.J. Coolidge is instructive not only for its historical interest, 
but also for the deployment of language and concepts that still have 
currency in contract law.  It relies on the precepts of contractual 
freedom, voluntariness, and assent to justify the enforcement of the 
contracts at issue.  Voluntariness and assent do much of the heavy 
lifting when it comes to subordination and exploitation.   
We no longer have slavery or even Jim Crow, but social 
position still matters in contract.  It is expressed in the perversity of 
the at-will employment doctrine,33 and in the judicial acquiescence to 
                                                                                                       
30  Julia Preston, Indictment Accuses Firm of Exploiting Thai Workers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/04/us/04trafficking.  
html (President and three other executives of Global Horizons Manpower 
indicted for coercing and reducing to peonage the largest number of workers 
in a recent human trafficking case). 
31  3 Haw. 810 (1877). 
32  The U.S. Department of Labor requires an application from 
employers who wish to hire foreign workers.  The H-2A is a visa for 
temporary farm workers.  In order to get visas to bring in foreign workers, the 
employer must state in an application that “there are not sufficient workers 
who are able, willing, qualified, and available, and that the employment of 
aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly 
employed U.S. workers.”  29 C.F.R. § 501.1(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (2010).  In addition, 
there is a continuing obligation to look for United States workers.  See 
Department of Labor, WORK AUTHORIZATION FOR NON-US CITIZENS: 
TEMPORARY AGRICULTURAL WORKERS, BASIC PROVISIONS/REQUIREMENTS, 
http://www.dol.gov/compliance/guide/taw.htm (last visited July 15, 2012).  
Recruiting workers from overseas then becomes a business with great potential 
for profits.  See, e.g., Team Nursing Servs. Inc. v. Evangelical Lutheran Good 
Samaritan Soc’y, 433 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2006) (deciding breach of contract 
claim where recruitment firm had previously earned $300,000 recruiting nurses 
to work in the Society’s non-profit nursing home). 
33  Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293 (N.Y. 1983).  
The New York Court of Appeals refuses to “alter the long standing rule that 
  




the corporate message that downsizing and outsourcing are both 
necessary and inevitable.34  For almost thirty years, each recession in 
a cyclical economy has been used to alter the relationship between 
employers and employees.  The economy may recover from a 
recession, but workers never do.  Each recession brings layoffs or 
buyouts, downsizing, outsourcing, and the displacement of workers 
into a contingent workforce.  35  The persistence over the past two 
decades of troubling employer practices—affecting both the number 
of people who work for corporations and the working conditions of 
blue and white collar workers, assembly line, and salaried middle 
                                                                                                       
where an employment contracts is for an indefinite term it is presumed to be a 
hiring at will.”  Id. at 300.  According to the New York Court of Appeals, 
“those jurisdictions that have modified the traditional at-will rule appear to 
have been motivated by conclusions that the freedom of contract 
underpinnings of the rule have become outdated, that individual employees in 
the modern work force do not have the bargaining power to negotiate security 
for the jobs on which they have grown to rely, and the rule yields harsh results 
for those employees who do not enjoy the benefits of express contractual 
limitations on the power of dismissal.”  Id. at 301.  The court in American Home 
Products shifted responsibility for reform to the legislature. 
34  A classic example of this language can be found in the decision 
written by Judge Lambros in United Steelworkers of America v. United States Steel 
Corp.  492 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (“This nation is in the throes of 
growing pains of similar intensity to the traumatic changes brought by the 
advent of the steam engine and the Industrial Revolution . . .”).  Only this new 
era presaged a “painful process of relocation and restructuring,” mostly for 
blue-collar workers.  Id. 
35  Definitions of contingent workers vary and the most 
commonplace definitions include those who work in conditions of job 
insecurity and who have few or no job benefits.  The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics generally considers contingent workers those who do not expect to 
be employed for a year or more while it classifies as “alternative employment” 
those who are hired as independent contractors, as temporary workers, on call 
workers or contract company workers.  See Chris Benner, Contingent & 
Temporary Workers in Work, in WORK IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
HISTORY, POLICY AND SOCIETY 108 (Carl E. Van Horn and Herbert A 
Schaffner eds., 2003).  It is possible to chart the restructuring of labor 
relationships in the reports on the various economic recessions over the past 
twenty years.  See e.g., Cindy Skrzycki, The Drive to Downsize; Trimming is a 
Corporate Fact of Life—But there are Hazards, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1989, at H1 
(recognition that downsizing was done to “increase productivity” as often as it 
was done in response to economic downturn.); Ralph A. Pyatt, Jr. The Big 
Question of Downsizing:  Whose Left to Earn and Spend?, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1993, 
at B15 (reporting that nearly half of major U.S. companies cut their work 
forces from July 1992 to June 1993); Louis Uchitelle, Downsizing Comes Back, 
but the Outcry is Muted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7 1998, at A1 (outcries and conflict 
that characterized the waves of downsizing in the 1980’s and early 1990’s” 
were gone by the end of the millennium). 
 




management—marks the downward trajectory of the American 
middle class.36 
James Galbraith has suggested in his book, Created Unequal: 
The Crisis in American Pay, that “public policies before 1970 largely 
supported a middle class society” and that this support meant a 
“broadly equal pattern of social progress was sustained.”37  The 
connection between conditions of employment, the creation of an 
expansive middle class and national pride seems to be lost on 
everyone except a recent recipient of a bailout.  The law affirms, at 
every turn, the practices which strip workers of the ability to counter 
the power of employers: multinational corporations and 
governments.  
For many years now, contract law courses have included 
cases that feature employment contracts, including wrongful 
termination and plant closing cases.  For an individual worker, the 
presumption of at-will employment is a juridical thumb on the scales 
of justice that dooms most wrongful termination cases.  After a brief 
interlude in which courts used employee handbooks and public 
policy to constrain the at-will doctrine, a retreat was sounded in the 
face of employer resistance.38  Employers altered the language and 
content of the employee handbooks to deny contractual intent.  
Retrenchment was assured once traditional contract jurisprudence, 
including formalism and the consideration doctrine, were 
deployed.39 
Plant closing cases were a different matter, however.  At 
least where collective bargaining agreements governed the 
relationship between workers and employers, the disparity in power 
                                                                                                       
36  Edward Luce, The Crisis of Middle Class America, FIN. TIMES MAG., 
July 30, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/1a8a5cb2-9ab2-11df-87e6-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1J89hCKaH; Catherine Ramell, Will Today’s 
Unemployed Become Tomorrow’s Unemployable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 02, 2010, http://  
economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/will-todays-unemployed-become-
tomorrows-unemployable/ (exploring the idea that cyclical unemployment can 
become structural unemployment).  
37  JAMES K. GALBRAITH, CREATED UNEQUAL:  CRISIS IN AMERICAN 
PAY 10 (2003) 
38  Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment 
Contract, 29 BERKELEY J EMP. & LAB. L. 345 (2008). 
39  In the case of employer/employee relations, an employer can 
modify the terms in a handbook with a need for further consideration other 
than continued employment.  An employee who wishes to prove that he or 
she has job security has to show that the employer has received additional 
consideration besides continued service by the employee.  Id. 
  




between the two parties was reduced and blue collar workers in the 
United States enjoyed a standard of living that made the United 
States a world leader in a meaningful way.  Beginning in the 1970’s 
and 1980’s, a mere forty years after federal legislation was passed to 
end labor strife and  to “erect a system of industrial self- 
government,” the economic security  of union workers was 
diminished as companies breached contracts with the complicity of 
courts that refused to enforce promises to keep plants open.40  The 
justification offered for plant closings was the competitive 
disadvantage suffered by American manufacturers in the global 
market because of high labor costs in the United States.  The focus 
was on the bottom line—on the lack of profits.  In retrospect, it 
would be fair to say that plant closings not only reduced the costs of 
production for corporate enterprises, a savings to multinational 
corporations, but they also weakened immeasurably the economic 
health of the nation and dealt an almost fatal blow to unions.41 
The success that the private sector had in crippling unions is 
now being played out in the public sector and the strategy is much 
the same.42  No one can dispute the fact that the federal, state, and 
                                                                                                       
40  Consider the decision in Abbington v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 561 F. 
Supp. 1290 (S.D. Ohio 1983), aff’d, 738 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1984), where a judge 
rejected a union claim that the CEO promised to keep a plant open for a 
minimum of two years if the Board approved of the modernization of the 
plants.  According to the judge deciding the case, “In the Fall of 1979, the 
financial condition of DMI continued to deteriorate.”  Id. at 1294.  However, 
the President of the company, the one who had persuaded employees to give 
up suspend cost of living adjustments and to accept a wage freeze and to sever 
their bargaining unit from that of the Ironton plant, stated in a 1984 interview, 
“In 1979, the industry was running at capacity.  Our company had peak sales 
of $184 million that year.”  The company made a net profit of $3.12 million 
but it was committed to a “growth plan” which involved moving its operations 
from Ohio and opening one in Meridian, Mississippi.  CONTRACTING LAW 
307-16 (Amy Kastely, Deborah Waire Post & Nancy Ota eds., 2006). 
41  Abbington, 561 F. Supp. at 1290.   
42  The New York Times reported that “State officials from both 
parties are wrestling with ways to curb the salaries and pensions of 
government employees, which typically make up a significant percentage of 
state budgets.”  Steven Greenhouse, Strained States Turning to Law to Curb Labor 
Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/04/ 
business/04labor.html.  It soon became obvious, at least to union members, 
that the legislation was not about budgets, but the existence of unions.  
Legislation limiting the bargaining power of unions, depriving them of union 
dues and forcing them to the certifying elections on an annual basis was 
framed initially as reforms driven by fiscal and budgetary needs.  See also Steven 
Greenhouse, Strained States Turning to Laws to Curb Labor Unions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 3, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/04/business/04 
 




local governments are operating at a deficit, but the austerity is a 
false austerity, created by a conscious decision to reduce revenues.  
Still, the rhetoric of scarcity and austerity has been effective in the 
states where legislatures have eviscerated public unions.  These 
public unions were one of the last bastions of the middle class 
where workers were guaranteed some measure of job security, 
health benefits and a living wage.43   
In an economy that has become addicted to speculation and 
paper profits, ironically enough the importance of labor is 
acknowledged only in advertisements aimed at the working class, 
designed to persuade the public to go out and buy the quintessential 
product of American culture:  the Chrysler 2010 Jeep Cherokee.44  
This advertisement expresses sentiments that evoke an emotional 
response; it deploys symbols associated with deeply held American 
values: our identity as “builders” who create skyscrapers and 
complete transcontinental railroads.  The commercial evokes the 
sense of personal satisfaction and national pride that can be found 
in the production of beautiful, well designed and well made goods.  
It evokes nostalgia for the good old days of assembly line 
production of cars:  
The things that make us Americans are the things we 
make.  This has always been a nation of builders, 
craftsmen, men and women for whom straight stitches 
and clean welds are a matter of personal pride.   
They made the skyscrapers, the cotton gins, colt 
revolvers and jeep 4x4s.  These things make us who we 
are.   
                                                                                                       
labor.html (reporting Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker’s statement in a 
speech, “We can no longer live in a society where the public employees are the 
haves and the taxpayers who foot the bills are the have-nots”).  
43  See, e.g., Jeffrey Poole et al. v. City of Waterbury et al, 831 A.2d 211 
(Conn. 2003) (oversight board created by state legislation has the power to 
arbitrate labor contract and limit the benefits of retired firefighters); Boston 
Hous. Auth. v. Nat’l Conf., Local 3, 935 N.E. 2d 1260 (Mass. 2010) 
(reinterpreting state legislation to invalidate arbitrator’s upholding a minimum 
staffing requirement that preserved the jobs of sixteen men working for the 
Boston Housing Authority after the arbitrator had rejected the justification 
offered by the BHA that it would save $1.2 million a year if it could fire these 
employees, noting that the BHA operated with a deficit since 1996 and that 
the deficit that year was lower than it had been at various time in the past). 
44  See DCHCJD of Temecula, 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee Manifesto 
Commercial from DCH Chyrsler Jeep Dodge of Temecula, YOUTUBE (June 10, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mi0SbrrGaiw 
  




As a people, we do well when we make good things, and 
not so well when we don’t.  The good news is this can 
be put right.  We just have to do it.  So we did it.   
This, our newest son, was imagined, drawn, carved, 
stamped here and forged here in America.  It is well 
made, and it is designed to work.  
This was once a country where people made things, 
beautiful things.  And so it is again.45 
One can laugh at this commercial and the identity it creates 
between assembly line work and national pride.  It is not as easy to 
dismiss the idea that work, pride and dignity are connected, 
particularly as we struggle through what is now sometimes called the 
Great Recession.46  
What was lost in the transformation from an industrial to an 
information economy was not just knowledge, or the wages that 
lifted up a significant part of the American workforce to the middle 
class, but self regard and dignity.  Capitalism is now, in the words of 
one scholar, “the space of the anti-market where financiers, 
speculators, and the political power of states come together to make 
profits without the constraints of competition.”47 
The recovery from the Great Recession has been described 
as “bifurcated” because those who have higher education, college 
graduates, are the only people who are being hired.  The jobs many 
of these college graduates are taking are those that were filled in the 
past by people who did not have the benefit of a higher education.  
In this new economy, education is corporatized and those who have 
an education and a job may not have the upward mobility or the 
social status that is associated with higher education.  In what is 
sometimes labeled an “information” or “knowledge” economy, 
intellectuals are just an “academic” workforce.48  Something close to 
                                                                                                       
45  Id. 
46  The economist and columnist Robert Samuelson says that the 
current economic crisis is “widely called” the Great Recession.  Robert J. 
Samuelson, The Great Recession’s Stranglehold, WASH. POST, July 12, 2010, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/11/A 
R2010071103038.html. 
47  Michael Blim, Capitalism in Late Modernity, 29 ANN. REV. 
ANTHROPOL. 25, 32 (2000) (drawing from FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE WHEELS 
OF COMMERCE:  CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM, 15TH-18TH CENTURY VOLS. 
1-3 (1984)). 
48  In 1997, the coalition on the Academic Workforce was formed by 
“learned societies in the humanities and the social sciences.”  Am. Ass’n of 
 




seventy percent of the professionals teaching in colleges and 
universities are contingent workers.49  If the accreditation standards 
for law schools are revised as proposed, law professors may soon 
join the ranks of other contingent workers.50 
We live in a time with no name, a period that we locate 
historically and chronologically with reference to the past.  We are 
post-modern, post-Marxist, post-racial, post-paradigmatic.  We are 
uncertain about our present and anxious and insecure about our 
future.  I admit to a dystopic vision of what is to come.  In this 
world, consent is found in the powerlessness of those who have no 
choices.  In the most extreme cases, people make desperate choices 
that involve the sale or lease of their bodies51 and judges affirm the 
right of doctors, and the research facilities in which they work, to 
patent the cells and DNA of their patients and sell them for profit.52   
                                                                                                       
Univ. Professors, About the Coalition on the Academic Workforce, http://www.  
aaup.org/AAUP/issues/contingent/caw.htm (updated May 2010). 
49  Finally one academic attributes the rise in contingent faculty to the 
corporatization of education, the growth of for-profit educational institutions.  
Peter Conn, We Need to Acknowledge the Realities of Employment in the Humanities, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (April 4, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/We-
Need-to-Acknowledge-the/64885/. 
50  The ABA Standards Review Committee website no longer has the 
reports of subcommittees and the Chair explaining its argument that 
accreditation standards never required tenure.  The proposed revisions that 
would have made it possible for universities to eliminate tenure in law schools 
are explained and discussed in letters of opposition found  under the heading 
“Comments on the Comprehensive Review “and the subheading “Terms and 
Conditions of Employment, Clinical Faculty and Security of Position.”  
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/committees/standards
_review.html  
51  Already there is a global market in gestation, with the outsourcing 
of surrogacy to India.  It has been documented in a film called Google Baby.  See 
Gina Bellafonte, Surrogate Pregnancy Goes Global, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/arts/television/16google.html (review 
of the HBO2’s Google Baby).  Following a court decision that declared 
surrogacy an “industry,” the Indian Parliament passed the Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Bill, which regulates the industry.  Poonam Taneja, 
India’s Surrogate Mother Industry, BBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2008), http://news.  
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7661127.stm; Shilpa Kannan, Regulators Eye India’s 
Surrogacy Sector, BBC NEWS (March 18, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/business/7935768.stm. 
52  Greenberg v. Miami Child. Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. 
Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (parents of children with the rare disease and a 
foundation which initiated research to identify the gene and create a screening 
test for the disease Canavan sued research institute that patented the genetic 
information); Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120 (Cal. 1990) 
  




If the liberatory potential of contract is to be salvaged or 
resurrected, legal scholars and judges may find it in the methodology 
of cultural critique and in the subversive behavior of their fellow 
humans.  The virtue of a cultural critique is that it invites us to ask 
whether something is truly impossible or simply unimagined because 
of what we think we know and what we believe to be true.  As long 
as I can find cases like Butler v. State,53 where an injustice certainly 
was done, I am also able to see evidence of our willingness as 
human beings to transgress, to subvert existing norms.  I am 
referring not just to Butler and Dillingham, but to the defense 
attorney who argued that Butler and Dillingham had a partnership 
and the presiding judge, who reprinted the defense brief in his 
dissent.  They held fast to what they knew the law required even 
though it meant that the state would have to acknowledge and 
enforce the agreements of private citizens, which subverted the 
social inequality that they understood and believed would continue 
to exist.  It is their ability to subvert their own beliefs that fuels my 
own “freedom dream[].”54 
 
                                                                                                       
(patients do not own their own cells once they are removed and research 
scientists can patent the genetic information they obtain using the patients 
tissues); but see Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 669 F. 
Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (breast cancer gene not patentable).   
53  111 S.W. 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908).  
54  See Anthony Farley, When the Stars Begin to Fall:  Introduction to 
Critical Race Theory and Marxism, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 226, 235 (2012). 
